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As we noted in a previous issue of the Review1, the President of the European Court of 
Human Rights (hereafter the Court), Jean-Paul Costa had publicly called upon the State 
Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter the ECHR or the 
Convention) to hold a conference of high level representatives to both re-emphasise 
State support for the Court and to initiate a process of long-term reform of the 
Strasbourg control system. Switzerland which was to assume the rotating chair of the 
Committee of Ministers, of the Council of Europe, undertook to organise such a 
conference, to be held in Interlaken, during its period of office in early 2010. 
 President Costa published a memorandum in the summer of 2009 setting out his 
hopes for the conference.2 After expressing his belief that the Convention and Court had 
achieved “remarkable success” in protecting human rights in the member States he 
observed that Court’s case load was too heavy.3 100,000 cases were pending before the 
Court and this resulted in the length of proceedings before the Court being excessive in 
some instances. Three categories of cases could be identified. First the large number of 
inadmissible applications. Second repetitive applications based upon structural defects in 
particular States previously identified by the Court. Third rarer applications raising novel 
issues. The Court had sought to enhance its efficiency in determining applications by, for 
example, developing the pilot judgment procedure.4 Funding of the Court from the 
member States of the Council of Europe had increased significantly. But, the Court did 
not have sufficient administrative autonomy within the Council of Europe or control over 
its internal judicial arrangements (e.g. the size of its Chambers). 
 The President then identified three aims for the Interlaken Conference. At the 
political level the Parties needed to endorse the “sharing of responsibilities between the 
                                           
1 A. Mowbray, “Crisis Measures of Institutional Reform for the European Court of Human 
Rights” (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review  64. 
 
2 Memorandum of the President of the European Court of Human Rights to the States 
With a View to preparing the Interlaken Conference, 3 July 2009: all the  Council of 
Europe documentation referred to  in this commentary is available from www.coe.int 
 
3 Ibid. at p. 1. 
 
4 See, D.J. Harris et al, Law of  the ECHR 2nd ed, (Oxford: OUP, 2009) at p. 851. 
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States and the Court.”5 Secondly, the Conference should begin the process of 
determining the long-term reforms necessary for the Court’s sixtieth anniversary in 
2019. Whilst the right of individual complaint to the Court ought to be preserved, how 
should such applications be regulated and determined? A new filtering mechanism under 
the control of the Court  might need to be created. The large numbers of repetitive 
applications disclosed that the principle of subsidiarity  (i.e. State Parties have the 
primary responsibility for guaranteeing the rights and freedoms enshrined in the 
Convention) was not working properly. A preliminary reference mechanism, inspired  by 
the experience of  the European Court of Justice, could be contemplated. Thirdly, during 
the shorter-term, States must expand their domestic translation of Court judgments and 
enhance their training of relevant personnel in Convention obligations. Whilst in the 
medium-term a Statute of the Court could facilitate both the enhancement of the Court’s 
autonomy and its internal adaptation to new working methods. The ultimate aim of the 
Conference should be to “lay down a clear roadmap for both the immediate and the 
more distant future.”.6 
 The Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), composed of experts 
appointed by the member States of the Council of Europe, was asked by the Committee 
of Ministers’ Deputies (their diplomatic representatives at Strasbourg) to prepare a paper 
on the topics to be discussed at the Interlaken Conference. CDDH produced its Opinion 
at the end of 2009.7 The paper began by outlining the scale of the workload crisis facing 
the Court. An ever increasing number of applications, of which about 90% are “clearly 
inadmissible”8, combined with about 50% of admissible applications raising complaints 
that are similar to previous cases adjudged by the Court (“repetitive applications”) 
meant that most Court time was spent on applications which should have been resolved 
at the national level. Furthermore, the Committee of Ministers role of supervising the 
execution of Court judgments where breaches of the Convention had been found9 was 
becoming increasingly challenging and the Committee, assisted by just 27 lawyers, 
currently had 8,600 judgments to  supervise. Consequently, in the view of  CDDH, 
“[t]his global situation is untenable and requires urgent action, not only to save the 
Court but also to reinforce the Convention system as a whole- which would have the 
result of relieving the burden on the Court and enhancing the effectiveness of the 
protection of individual rights.”10 
 Regarding medium to long-term developments of the ECHR system, CDDH 
strongly supported the maintenance of the right of individual petition by aggrieved 
applicants.11 But that had to be combined with, what should be the main goal of the 
                                           
5 Supra n. 2 at p. 3. 
 
6 Ibid. at p. 7. 
 
7 CM(2009)181: 2 December 2009. 
 
8 Ibid. at para. 5. 
 
9 Under Article 46 of the ECHR. 
 
10 Supra n.7 at para. 8. 
 
11 Under Article 34 of the ECHR. 
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Interlaken Conference, making the “principle of subsidiarity...fully operational”.12 Long-
term effectiveness also required that there should be an equilibrium between the 
numbers of applications being made to the Court and its ability to determine them. The 
achievement of this goal would necessitate a reduction in the number of  inadmissible 
applications and repetitive complaints (by effective national protection of Convention 
rights/freedoms) together with the  more effective processing of cases by the Court. 
CDDH also raised the controversial question as to whether in the long-term the Court 
ought to have the power to select which applications would receive a judicial 
determination. However, CDDH did not believe that it was appropriate at present to offer 
specific proposals regarding this matter. 
 Proposals for long-term reform which CDDH considered should be subject to 
further examination included the promotion of national courts collaboration with the 
Court by the former being able to seek advisory opinions from the latter on the  
interpretation of the Convention. A study of whether the levels of just satisfaction (i.e. 
financial compensation) awarded by the Court to successful applicants13  encouraged 
applications being lodged with the Court. The possibility of amendments to the 
procedures of the Court being agreed by the Committee of Ministers (via a Statute of the 
Court), rather than through the protracted process of States agreeing an amending 
Protocol to the Convention. Evaluating whether a new filtering mechanism to determine 
the admissibility of applications, going beyond the new single-judge formation in Protocol 
14/Protocol 14 bis, ought to be created. The introduction of fees for making an 
application to the Court, to deter clearly inadmissible applications, might be 
contemplated. Regarding the appointment of Judges to the Court, CDDH advocated 
“transparent and rigorous selection procedures at the national and European levels”14. 
CDDH proposed that the Court’s Judges should have a knowledge of public international 
law. Finally, CDDH recommended that the development of the ECHR system following on 
from the Interlaken Conference should be based upon the effects of the reforms 
introduced by Protocols 14/14bis. 
 The next Council of Europe institution to publish a memorandum directed at the 
Interlaken Conference was the Commissioner for Human Rights (Thomas 
Hammarberg).15 He believed that the high level of clearly inadmissible applications being 
lodged with the Court disclosed, “serious deficiencies in the provision of information on 
the ECHR and the Court’s procedures.”16 When combined with the large number of 
repetitive applications and the high success rate of cases reaching a judgment on the 
merits (in over 81% of  judgments since 1959 the original and full-time Courts have 
found at least one violation17) these statistics led the Commissioner to conclude that, 
                                                                                                                                   
 
12 Supra n.7 at para. 10. 
 
13 Under Article 41 of the ECHR. 
 
14 Supra n. 7 at para. 30. 
 
15 CommDH(2009)38: 7 December 2009. 
 
16 Ibid. at para.4. 
 
17 Ibid. at para. 2. 
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“there is a serious gap of systematic implementation by States of their undertakings 
under the Convention”.18 Therefore, the Commissioner advocated, inter alia, that State 
Parties to the ECHR translate all the leading judgments of the Court into their national 
languages to facilitate domestic courts comprehension of the Convention’s principles. 
Such translations would also foster national scrutiny of draft legislation and 
administrative policies for their compatibility with the ECHR. Drawing upon his earlier 
published recommendation19, the Commissioner proposed  that States ought to develop 
national human rights action plans. These would aim to “integrate human rights into the 
ordinary work of the public administration”20 and “foster a human rights culture”21 by 
incorporating their study in education and training. The Commissioner invited the State 
Parties to  commit themselves, at Interlaken, to initiating and implementing these 
national measures. 
 The Secretary General of the Council of Europe (Thorbjorn Jagland) produced a 
paper for the Interlaken Conference in which he expressed the view that the Court was 
in a “desperate situation”.22 As many States had failed to effectively entrench the 
Convention the consequence was that numerous persons lodged applications with the 
Court. But, he did not believe that the Court should “be acting as a small claims court for 
violations of relatively minor consequence for individuals arising from persistent systemic 
problems.”23  Conversely he cautioned against perceiving the Court as Europe’s supreme 
court: 
“In recent years, there has been undefined talk of the Court becoming a 
“Constitutional Court”. Although this has not yet led to any sort of agreement, let 
alone results, it has not been helpful. The Convention is not intended to be a 
“European constitution” and it is difficult to see how the Court could become like 
any existing national constitutional court.”24 
However, the Secretary General supported strengthening the co-operation between 
national courts and the Court and, therefore, he favoured enabling the latter to receive 
requests for advisory opinions/preliminary rulings from the former. To ensure the Court’s 
expertise and experience he advocated considering the establishment of a screening 
panel, composed of former senior national and international judges, to examine lists of 
judicial nominees before they were submitted to the Parliamentary Assembly. To deal 
                                                                                                                                   
 
18 Ibid. at para. 5. 
 
19 Recommendation on systematic work for implementing human rights at the national 
level, CommDH(2009)3: 18 February 2009. 
 
20 Supra n.15 at para. 22. 
 
21 Ibid. at para. 23. 
 
22 Contribution of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to the Preparation of 
the Interlaken Ministerial Conference, SG/Inf(2009)20, 18 December 2009, at para.15. 
 
23 Ibid. at para. 7. 
 
24 Ibid. at para 28. 
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with the mass of inadmissible applications lodged with the Court, the Secretary General 
strongly encouraged the Court to develop, in the short-term, a rotational system 
amongst the existing Judges to filter applications and in the future he raised the 
possibility of delegating the determination of some case decisions to Registry officials 
subject to judicial control. 
 The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (of the Council of Europe’s 
Parliamentary Assembly) held a hearing, on 16 December 2009, at which a number of 
experts presented their views on the issues to be addressed at the Interlaken 
Conference. Subsequently, the Chairperson of the Committee (Mrs Herta Daubler-
Gmelin) produced a summary of the most important points raised during the hearing.25 
These included asking whether ministers would be willing to “name and shame” States 
that were jeopardising the ECHR system by failing to comply with their Convention 
obligations and supporting agreed reform measures? She also addressed the sensitive 
topic of  the quality of the Strasbourg Judges: 
The most eminent jurists in member states with relevant experience should be 
encouraged to leave flourishing national careers, preferably in their late 40s, 50s 
and early 60s, to serve in Strasbourg. When national selection procedures are 
inadequate, the Assembly’s hands are tied; often candidates are good, but not 
outstanding. If the findings of the Strasbourg Court are to be recognised as 
authoritative by their peers at the domestic level, the Assembly must be in a 
position to elect top quality judges.26 
The Court was unable to provide “justice to all individuals” and the roles of Committees 
and single-judge formations within  the Court constituted a “”fig-leaf” that maintains the 
legal fiction of a judicial determination of all applications”.27  Furthermore: 
it is totally absurd for the Court and its staff to waste time and effort in dealing 
with repetitive applications (surely old democracies, like Italy, not to mention more 
recent “persistent defaulters” such as Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia and 
Ukraine, ought to be subjected to “aggravated”, if not “punitive” or “exemplary”, 
damages”.28 
Was it necessary to create a new judicial filtering body within the Court or could that 
task be undertaken by a rotating pool drawn from the current Judges?  Might the 
introduction of a small fee for lodging an application with the Court deter hopeless 
complainants? If States were to reinforce their domestic mechanisms for safeguarding 
Convention rights, including creating parliamentary bodies to oversee the national 
implementation of measures to address Court judgments finding breaches of  the ECHR, 
                                           
25 The future of the Strasbourg Court and enforcement of ECHR standards: reflections on 
the Interlaken process, AS/Jur(2010)06, 21 January 2010. 
 
26 Ibid. at para. 5. 
 
27 Ibid. at para. 9. 
 
28 Ibid. 
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that would make a significant contribution to reducing the flood of applications engulfing 
the Court. 
 A group of non-governmental organisations produced a Joint NGO appeal to the 
Interlaken Conference29. The submission began by noting that the people in Europe have 
at least as strong an interest in the long-term effectiveness of the Court as the Sates, 
therefore civil society should be consulted before the Conference and during the 
subsequent reform process. The NGOs supported greater help being given to potential 
applicants regarding the ECHR’s admissibility criteria. Wider translation of the Court’s 
jurisprudence would facilitate enhanced domestic understanding and safeguarding of 
Convention rights. The Judges of the Court must be selected via inclusive and 
transparent processes. Contributing NGOs opposed measures, such as application fees, 
new admissibility criteria or empowering the Court to exercise a selective discretion over 
cases accepted for adjudication, that would undermine the access of individual 
complainants to the Court. Further deliberation was needed on whether national courts 
should be authorised to seek advisory opinions from the Court or if a simplified 
mechanism for amending the procedures of the Court should be created. 
 The Interlaken Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereafter the Conference) was held on 18-19 February 2010. Shortly before the 
Conference formally opened the Russian government deposited its instrument of 
ratification of Protocol 14 (to the ECHR). This long-awaited development was a 
significant contribution towards enhancing the efficiency of the Court and a positive start 
to the Conference. The Chairperson of the Committee of Ministers (Micheline Calmy-Rey) 
welcomed the ratification as “excellent news for all Europeans”.30 While the Secretary 
General stated that this action demonstrated Russia’s “commitment to Europe”. 
Furthermore, the ratification was “the result of a dialogue conducted with the highest 
Russian authorities and signals the start of a genuine reform of the Court.”31  Protocol 14 
will enter into force in June 2010, replacing the more circumscribed interim reforms 
contained in Protocol 14bis32.   
 The Conference began at 3pm on the 18 February, but “heads of delegations at 
ministerial level and high officials of the institutions of the Council of Europe” were given 
the opportunity to go on a preliminary five  and a half hour excursion to Murren to enjoy 
                                           
29 Human rights in Europe: decision time on the European Court of Human Rights, 7 
December 2009: text contained in Preparatory Contributions High Level Conference on 
the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Directorate General of Human Rights 
and Legal Affairs, (2010); www.coe.int/justice  The contributing NGOs were: Amnesty 
International, the Aire Centre, European Human Rights Advocacy Centre, Human Rights 
Watch, Interights, the International Commission of Jurists, Justice, Liberty and Redress. 
I am grateful to Jill Heiler of Amnesty International for drawing my attention to this 
material. 
 
30 Press Release 139(2010), 18 February 2010. 
 
31 Press Release 140(2010), 18 February 2010. 
 
32 Discussed in Mowbray supra n.1. 
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“panoramic views of the Swiss Alps”.33 After ten minute addresses by leading Council of 
Europe figures, including the Secretary General, President Costa and the Commissioner 
for Human Rights, each State’s head of delegation (most of whom were Ministers of 
Justice) were given three minutes to make their statements. These statements were 
spread over the afternoon/early evening of the 18th and the morning of the 19th. A 
representative of NGOs gave a ten minute address on behalf of civil society. The 
Conference concluded, by lunchtime, with all the delegates adopting the Interlaken 
Declaration (hereafter the Declaration) and Action Plan34 by acclamation. 
 The Declaration began by expressing the State Parties “strong commitment” to 
the Convention and the Court.35 But, the Strasbourg supervisory system was subsidiary 
to “the fundamental role which national authorities, ie. governments, courts and 
parliaments, must play in guaranteeing and protecting human rights at the national 
level.”36 Additional measures were “urgently required” to secure a balance between the 
numbers of applications being made to the Court and the number of judgments and 
decisions given by the Court. Furthermore, the Court had to be able to reduce the 
backlog of pending cases. Therefore, an Action Plan was adopted which provided 
“political guidance for the process towards long-term effectiveness of the Convention 
system”.37 Whilst reaffirming the “fundamental importance” of the right of individual 
petition to the Court, the Action Plan called upon the Committee of Ministers to examine 
new procedural rules or practices regulating access to the Court.38 State Parties were 
invited to have regard to Court judgments involving other States where similar problems 
existed in their legal systems. Also, the possibility of seconding national judges and high-
level lawyers to the Registry of the Court should be considered. The Action Plan 
recommended  that the Court, in the short-term, implement a mechanism “within the 
existing bench” to “ensure effective filtering” of applications.39 Whilst the Committee of 
Ministers should consider the creation of a filtering mechanism, “within the Court going 
beyond the single judge procedure”.40  Also, the Committee ought to examine whether 
the judges responsible for filtering could in the future be empowered to determine 
repetitive cases. The judges of the Court should have “knowledge of public international 
law” and “the Court’s composition should comprise the necessary practical legal 
experience”.41 The Court was encouraged to request (under Article 6 of Protocol 14) the 
                                           
33 Conference programme: I am indebted to Dr Ed Bates for drawing my attention to the 
touristic delights available to senior participants at the conference. 
 
34 19 February 2010. 
 
35 Ibid. at PP1. 
 
36 Ibid. at PP6. 
 
37 Ibid. (11). 
 
38 Ibid. A.3. 
 
39 Ibid. C.6(c). 
 
40 Ibid. 
 
41 Ibid. E.8. 
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Committee of Ministers to authorise the reduction, for a fixed period of time, in the size 
of Chambers to five judges. The supervision of the execution of judgments by the 
Committee of Ministers should be made more “efficient and transparent” by, inter alia, 
according greater priority to cases disclosing  significant structural problems. The 
Conference also called upon the Committee of Ministers to examine the  feasibility of 
introducing a simplified mechanism, such as a Statute for the Court, for future reforms 
of procedural elements of the Convention. The State Parties and the Committee of 
Ministers should consult with civil society on the implementation of the Action Plan. A 
series of deadlines were elaborated. By the end of 2011 State Parties should inform the 
Committee of Ministers of their actions taken to implement the Action Plan. The 
Committee of Ministers, by June 2011, ought to implement those measures not requiring 
amendment of the ECHR. The Committee should also authorise its competent bodies to 
produce specific proposals for measures requiring amendment of the ECHR (including a 
filtering mechanism and a simplified reform process) by June 2012. Between 2012 and 
2015 the Committee of Ministers would assess the effects of Protocol 14 and the 
implementation of the Action Plan on the workload of the Court. By the end of 2015 the 
Committee should decide if further action was necessary. Before the end of 2019 the 
Committee ought to review if the Strasbourg control system is operating on a 
sustainable basis. If not, then more profound reforms may be necessary. 
 The  Declaration and Action Plan met President Costa’s wishes for the Conference 
in that all the State Parties publicly expressed strong support for the Convention and the 
Court, together with the principle of subsidiarity. Also a timetable, extending over almost 
a decade, was set out during which different forms of reforms should be considered and 
implemented within defined periods of time.  Generally, the  major future institutional 
reforms of the ECHR system, requiring amendments to the Convention, identified by the 
Conference were ideas that have been circulating in Council of Europe fora  during recent 
years. For example, the suggestion that a new judicial filtering body should be 
established as an adjunct of the Court was one of the key recommendations of the 
Group of Wise Persons report in 2006.42 It is interesting, however, to detect a desire to 
reinforce (enhance?) the calibre of the Court’s Judges. We have already noted Mrs 
Daubler-Gmelin’s observations.43 Without casting any aspersions we may contrast the 
(relative) youth and  professional experience of the Court’s newest Judge (appointed in 
June 2009) who was born in 1973, gained her law degree in 1999 and was called to the 
Bar in 2002.44 The Conference endorsed CDDH’s view that the Judges should have a 
knowledge of public international law. This is not  expressly required by Article 21 of the 
ECHR. However, from its early case-law the Court has acknowledged the relevance of 
public international law to the interpretation of the Convention.45 Furthermore, in recent 
                                                                                                                                   
 
42 Final Report CM(2006)203, 15 November 2006 and see A. Mowbray, “Faltering Steps 
on the Path to Reform of the Strasbourg Enforcement System” (2007) 7 Human Rights 
Law Review 609.  
HRLR 
 
43 Supra n.26. 
 
44 Judge Pardalos (San Marino) according to her biography on the Court’s website. 
 
45 For example, in Golder v UK (1975) 1 E.H.R.R. 524 and see A. Mowbray, “The 
Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights” (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 
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months the Court has delivered a number of judgments in which public international law 
played a central role in the Court’s reasoning. For example, in Rantsev v Cyprus and 
Russia46 a unanimous Chamber utilised a multilateral treaty to extend (and define) 
Article 4 of the Convention to encompass human trafficking. A united Grand Chamber in 
Cudak v Lithuania47 had regard to the trend in international law, limiting the scope of 
State immunity in respect of employment disputes involving local staff working in 
diplomatic missions, when assessing the extent of the right of access to a court 
enshrined in Article 6(1) of the ECHR. Whilst the Grand Chamber in Medvedyev and 
others v France48 was deeply divided on whether, inter alia,  diplomatic notes justified, 
under Article 5 of the ECHR, the arrest and detention by French commandos,  in 
international waters, of suspected drugs smugglers on board a foreign registered vessel. 
Pertinently President Costa in his Joint Partial Dissent observed, “[w]e believe that our 
Court, which operates in the field of general public international law, should take the 
existence of [those notes] into account...”.49 Hence  there is good reason for the 
Strasbourg Judges to have an understanding of public international law. 
 The Committee of Ministers’ Deputies “took note” of the Interlaken Declaration 
within a week of its promulgation.50 On the same day Amnesty International expressed 
concern that some support had been given at the Conference to the idea of charging a 
fee to lodge a complaint with the Court.51 Therefore, we can see the post-Declaration 
debate beginning about the specific reforms needed. The magnitude of the essential 
reforms of the Strasbourg supervisory system are likely to bear an inverse correlation 
with the degree to which all States party to the ECHR actually fulfil their legal obligations 
under the Convention and their political commitment to subsidiarity embodied in the 
Declaration. If “persistent defaulters”, to use Mrs Daubler-Gmelin’s terminology, 
effectively address their repeated failures to safeguard Convention rights within their 
domestic jurisdictions then the Court’s workload should decline. That would reduce the 
need for new institutional machinery, such as a separate filtering body. But, if a hard-
core of States continue to tolerate widespread breaches of ECHR rights and freedoms 
then fundamental institutional and procedural changes beyond Protocol 14’s measures 
will become essential. We shall continue to analyse the future reform process.  
 
                                                                                                                                   
57 at 58. For a general study of the influence of public international law on the Court’s 
jurisprudence see  F. Vanneste, General International Law Before Human Rights Courts 
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2010). 
 
46 Judgment of 7 January 2010. 
 
47 Judgment of 23 March 2010. 
  
48 Judgment of 29 March 2010. 
 
49 Ibid. Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Costa, Casadevall, Birsan, Garlicki, 
Hajiyev, Sikuta and Nicolaou at para. 4. 
 
50 1077th meeting, 24 February 2010. 
 
51 Jill Heine, Amnesty International’s Legal Advisor for Europe: 
www.amnesty.org/en/news  
 
